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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the relationship between corporate social responsibility and executive 
compensation disclosure quality. We test whether socially responsible firms disclose more 
transparent and detailed information about their executive compensation packages than firms that 
are less committed to social responsibility initiatives. Using a sample of 187 publicly listed 
Canadian firms, we find a positive relation between CSR and executive compensation disclosure 
quality. We also document a positive (negative) association between firm size (ownership 
concentration) and executive compensation disclosure. These findings support the conclusion that 
increased disclosure transparency reflects a company’s social engagement towards its 
stakeholders. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ecently, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has attracted increasing attention from shareholders, 
customers, regulators, and other firm’s stakeholders. Many firms around the world are integrating, 
either voluntarily or under pressure from their stakeholders, social and environmental issues in their 
strategic planning (Deng et al., 2013). Stakeholder theory scholars argue that the firm should not only focus on 
shareholders’ interests but should aim to serve all non shareholder stakeholders which should translate in better 
financial results (Freeman, 1984). However, the extent literature reports mixed evidence on the link between social 
and financial performance (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Barnett & Solomon, 2012) and the 
causality direction between social performance and firm value remains an unresolved issue (Orlitzky et al., 2003; 
Cheng et al., 2013). In an attempt to further explain the causality link between CSR investments and financial 
performance, recent academic research has explored the channels through which the adoption of socially responsible 
practices may affect financial performance. Recent studies have examined executive compensation practices (Frye et 
al., 2006; Cai et al., 2011; Collett Miles & Miles, 2013), financial reporting quality and disclosure practices (Gelb & 
Strawser, 2001; Kim et al., 2012; Dawkins & Fraas, 2013), and corporate investment strategies (Deng et al., 2013) 
of socially responsible (SR) firms. 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between the adoption of social responsibility 
practices and the quality of executive compensation disclosure. Gelb & Strawser (2001) contend that managers may 
use their voluntary disclosure practices as a device to show their commitment to high ethical standards that promote 
disclosure transparency. Therefore, stakeholders may expect that socially responsible firms will exhibit higher 
transparency in their financial and non financial disclosures than other firms because transparent disclosures reflect a 
socially responsible behavior (Gelb & Strawser, 2001). Following this argument, we test whether SR firms disclose 
more transparent and detailed information about their executive compensation packages than firms that are less 
engaged in social responsible initiatives. We focus on executive compensation disclosures because investors, 
regulators, and other stakeholders in many countries around the world have raised a number of concerns over 
R 
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excessive compensation packages granted to executives as well as the lack of transparency of executive 
compensation disclosures (Core et al., 2003; McFarland, 2003; Schiehll, 2005).
1
 
 
Based on a sample of 187 firms listed on Toronto Stock Exchange, we find a positive and significant 
relationship between the adoption of social responsibility practices and transparency of executive compensation 
disclosure. These results are consistent with Gelb & Strawser (2001) and suggest that increased disclosure 
transparency reflects firm’s social engagement towards its stakeholders. Our paper contributes to the growing 
literature on financial disclosure and reporting practices of socially responsible firms (Chih et al., 2008; Kim et al., 
2012; Dawkins & Fraas, 2013; Hoi et al., 2013). It also extends the findings of prior studies on the determinants of 
compensation disclosure quality (Coulton et al., 2001; Clarkson et al., 2006; Laksmana, 2008; Muslu, 2010; Ben-
Amar & Zeghal, 2011) by showing that the firm’s commitment towards its stakeholders is a key determinant of its 
disclosure policy. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine this association between social 
responsibility and the transparency of executive compensation disclosure. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review relevant literature and present 
our research hypothesis. In the third section, we describe our sample and research methodology. The fourth section 
presents and discusses the study’s results and is followed by a conclusion. 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
Stakeholder theory suggests that the firm should serve the interests of all its stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). 
Therefore, in addition to shareholders’ wealth, socially responsible firms should care about the welfare of their 
employees, customers, local communities in which they operate, and other non shareholder stakeholders (Frye et al., 
2006). CSR investments should translate in better financial results through a better access of the firm to valuables 
resources such as quality employees, better marketing of the firm’s products and social legitimacy with local 
communities (Cheng et al., 2013). However, empirical studies that explored the link between social and financial 
performance provide mixed evidence (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Barnett & Solomon, 2012; Cheng et al., 2013). 
 
To better understand the link between stakeholder management and financial performance, recent academic 
research has explored whether compensation practices, financial reporting, and disclosure strategies and growth 
strategies differ between socially and non socially responsible. Frye et al. (2006) document a weaker pay-
performance link and a higher probability of CEO turnover in SR firms in comparison to non SR firms. Cai et al. 
(2011) and Collett Miles & Miles (2013) report a negative association between the adoption of socially responsible 
practices and CEO compensation levels. Cai et al. (2011) argue that their findings are consistent with the conflict-
resolution hypothesis of CSR. CEO in SR firms with high ethical standards may accept a lower compensation than 
CEO in non SR firms to help alleviate potential agency conflicts with other stakeholders and avoid any concerns 
about wealth distribution between the firm and its stakeholders (Cai et al., 2011). Previous research shows also that 
firm’s social performance affects the financial success of major investments. Consistent with the stakeholder value 
maximization, Deng et al. (2013) find that mergers undertaken by SR firms generate higher returns to their 
shareholders and are associated to better long term operating performance than mergers by non SR firms. Given the 
stakeholders’ support, Deng et al. (2013) show also that mergers by SR firms are finalized quicker and are less likely 
to fail than mergers undertaken by non SR firms. 
 
Previous research (Gelb & Strawser, 2001; Chih et al., 2008; Kim et al. 2012) suggest also that social 
performance may be related to financial reporting quality as well as financial disclosure practices. This literature is 
based on ethical theories (Carroll, 1979; Jones, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995) which suggest that the firm has 
an ‘ethical obligation’ towards its stakeholders. Kim et al. (2012, p. 765) contend that SR ‘firms/managers have an 
incentive to be honest, trustworthy and ethical in their business processes, and thus tend to adhere to a high 
standard of behavior.’ Therefore, stakeholders may expect that accounting choices and disclosure practices of SR 
firms will reflect the managers’ and company’s high ethical values. Consistent with this ethical obligation, Kim et 
al. (2012) find that SR firms are less likely to manage earnings either through discretionary accruals or real 
                                                 
1 Regulatory authorities in The United States and Canada have enacted in 2006 and 2008 new rules and regulations to enhance the transparency of 
the information disclosed about executive compensation practices and respond to stakeholders’ concerns. 
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operating activities than non SR firms. Their results show also that SR firms are less likely to be involved in SEC 
investigations. Chih et al. (2008) report also a negative association between CSR and earnings smoothing in a large 
sample of firms from 46 countries. Consistent with the ethical commitment of SR firms, Hoi et al. (2013) document 
a negative association between social responsibility initiatives and tax avoidance activities. 
 
Gelb & Strawser (2001) conjecture that the firm’s disclosure practices will reflect its commitment towards 
its stakeholders. Based on the firm’s ethical obligation, Gelb & Strawser (p. 3) contend that ‘increased disclosure is 
a form of social responsible behavior.’ Their results show that SR firms are associated to more extensive financial 
disclosure than non SR firms. Dawkins & Fraas (2013) document also that social performance affects disclosure 
practices in the annual report. Following Gelb & Strawser (2001), we expect that SR firms will exhibit more 
transparency in their executive compensation disclosures than non SR firms. Given the stakeholders’ concerns about 
executive compensation levels and lack of transparency of information about compensation practices, we expect that 
SR will respond to these concerns by enhancing their disclosure transparency. Managers of SR firms will adhere to 
high ethical values and are more likely to integrate stakeholders’ demands for increased disclosures about 
compensation practices. We therefore expect a positive association between the adoption of social responsibility 
practices and executive compensation disclosure transparency. We offer an empirical test of the following 
hypothesis H1: 
 
H1: Socially responsible firms disclose more transparent information about their executive compensation 
practices than non-socially responsible firms. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Sample Description 
 
This paper explores the link between social performance and compensation disclosure transparency of a 
sample of Canadian firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. We focus on firms included in the S&P TSX 
composite index with available corporate governance rankings in The Globe & Mail (G&M) Report on Business 
(ROB) annual study of corporate governance practices. The Globe & Mail has published annual scores of the 
corporate governance practices of Canadian publicly listed firms since 2002. The G&M annual survey assesses the 
quality of board composition, shareholding and compensation policy, shareholder rights policy, and corporate 
governance disclosure quality (McFarland, 2006). Previous studies relied on the G&M corporate governance scores 
to examine the relationship between corporate governance quality and firm value (Klein et al., 2005) and earnings 
quality (Niu, 2006). We focus on the year 2006 because the G&M introduced in that year an important change to the 
annual governance index with the addition of several questions designed to assess the transparency of compensation 
disclosure (McFarland, 2006). We use the G&M compensation disclosure scores to evaluate the transparency of 
information disclosed about executive compensation practices. Further, we limit our analysis to the year 2006 
because new executive compensation disclosure rules were introduced in Canada in 2008. The new disclosure rules 
introduced a standardized format for the presentation of compensation related information and thus limited the 
discretion that managers enjoyed previously in the disclosure of compensation practices. Our final sample includes 
187 firms with available disclosure scores, financial, ownership, and compensation data. 
 
3.2 Variable Description 
 
Table 1 presents a description of the study’s variables. Our dependent variable is the executive 
compensation disclosure transparency. Similar to Ben-Amar & Zeghal (2011) we rely on the G&M 2006 
compensation disclosure scores to measure our dependent variable. The G&M has evaluated the disclosure practices 
related to the information provided about the CEO total compensation, the quality of disclosures in relation to the 
CEO bonus, disclosure about the annual pension paid to the CEO upon retirement as well as disclosures on the value 
of the CEO’s equity ownership (McFarland, 2006). This variable ranges from 0 to 10. Table 2 presents the 
distribution of 10 marks between the disclosure items. 
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Table 1: Variable Description 
Variable Expected Sign Description 
Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Score  
Executive Compensation Disclosure Transparency score as reported in 
the 2006 G&M annual corporate governance rankings. This variable 
ranges from 0 to 10 (Source: The Globe & Mail).  
Independent Variable 
Social Responsibility + 
Dummy variable that equals one if the company is included in the Jantzi 
Social Index as of 31 December 2005 and zero otherwise 
(Sustainalytics.com).  
Control Variables 
Ownership Concentration  
Dummy variable that equals one if inside ownership exceeds 10% and 
zero otherwise (Source: Stock-Guide Database). 
Options Percentage - 
Ratio of Options compensation to the CEO total compensation  
(Source: proxy circulars) 
Firm Size + Logarithm of total assets (Source: Stock-Guide Database) 
Leverage +/- 
Leverage ratio (total debt / total assets) 
(Source: Stock-Guide Database). 
ROA (%) +/- Return on Assets (Source: Stock-Guide Database).  
Pricetobook + 
Ratio of the market value to the book value of equity  
(Source: Stock-Guide Database). 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Executive Compensation Disclosure Marks 
Disclosure Item Maximum Marks 
CEO bonus 4 
CEO total compensation 2 
CEO estimated annual pension 1 
Accrued pension liability for the CEO 1 
Total value of the CEO’s accumulated shares, DSUs or other equity holdings 1 
Total cost of compensation to the top executive team as a percentage of the total profit or 
total shareholder return for the year 
1 
Total 10 marks 
 
Our independent variable, corporate social responsibility, is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
the company is included in the Jantzi Social Index as of 31 December 2005 and zero otherwise. The Jantzi social 
index was launched in 2000 by Jantzi research
2
 and consists of 60 Canadian companies rated based on 
environmental, social and governance criteria. The Jantzi social index does not include firms operating in 
‘irresponsible’ activities such as the manufacturing of tobacco products, fire arms industry, and nuclear power 
production. Prior studies used similar approaches to assess corporate social performance. For instance, Frye et al. 
(2006) used the 400 firms included in Domini Social (DS 400) index as a sample of socially responsible firms. Chih 
et al. (2008) consider that firms included in the FTSE4 GOOD index as socially responsible. 
 
Consistent with executive compensation disclosure literature (Clarkson et al., 2006; Laksmana, 2008; 
Muslu, 2010), we control for several control variables deemed to affect the firm’s disclosure practices. The control 
variables include ownership concentration, percentage of stock options in total compensation, firm size, leverage, 
firm performance, and growth opportunities. Ownership concentration reduces agency costs as well as the need for 
extensive disclosures to reduce information asymmetry. Laksmana (2008, p. 1161) argue also ‘that the presence of 
blockholders and institutional holders could reduce the concerns of outside shareholders about unjustified executive 
compensation.’ This suggests a negative association between ownership concentration and executive compensation 
disclosure quality. Consistent with Laksmana (2008), we expect also a negative relation between stock options 
compensation’s percentage in CEO total compensation. Previous studies suggest that the level of disclosure is 
related to the firm’s financial characteristics. For example, Meek et al. (1995), Eng & Mak (2003) and Lang & 
Lundholm (1993) find a positive association between firm size and disclosure levels. In addition, Ahmed & Courtis 
(1999) show that leverage is associated with the level of disclosure. We also control for firm performance in our 
                                                 
2 In 2009, Jantzi Research merged with Sustainalytics (www.sustainalytics.com). 
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multivariate analysis because a number of previous studies (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Lang & Lundholm, 1993) 
report a significant relation between firm performance and disclosure quality. We measure firm performance by the 
return on assets (ROA). Finally, we expect a positive association between growth opportunities and the transparency 
of executive compensation disclosure (Hossain et al., 2005). We measure the growth opportunities by the ratio of the 
market value to the book value of equity. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3 presents the main descriptive statistics of our variables. Our sample includes 187 firms, 49 socially 
responsible firms included in Jantzi social index and 138 non-socially responsible firms. The average disclosure 
score is 3.39 while the median is 3.00. Given that the disclosure score varies between 0 and 10, the average and 
median scores suggest that information disclosed about executive compensation packages of our sample firms is 
rather poor. Table 3 shows that socially responsible firms exhibit higher executive compensation disclosure scores 
than non-socially responsible counterparts. The average executive compensation disclosure score is 4.67 for socially 
responsible sample in comparison to 2.93 for non-socially responsible firms. The difference between the two groups 
is statistically significant. With regards to control variables, Table 3 shows that socially responsible firms are larger 
and are associated with lower growth opportunities than non-socially responsible firms. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Total Sample 
(N = 187) 
Socially Responsible Firms 
(N = 49) 
Non-Socially  
Responsible Firms 
(N = 138) 
Stat. t 
 Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD  
Dependant Variable 
Disclosure Score 3.39 3.00 2.27 4.67 4.00 2.61 2.93 2.00 1.96 -4.24 *** 
Control Variables 
Ownership 
Concentration 
0.59 1.00 0.493 0.51 1.00 0.505 0.62 1.00 0.488 1.29 
Option Percentage 0.263 0.218 0.244 0.239 0.203 0.244 0.272 0.233 0.254 0.79 
Size 14.741 14.542 1.818 16.145 15.991 1.684 14.24 14.132 1.593 -7.07 *** 
Leverage 0.170 0.158 0.149 0.198 0.204 0.147 0.160 0.139 0.149 -1.50 
Return on Assets 
(%) 
2.94 3.95 12.64 3.331 4.36 8.720 2.80 3.90 13.79 -0.252 
Pricetobook 3.263 2.480 2.546 2.746 2.490 1.260 3.447 2.440 2.849 2.32 ** 
 
Table 4 presents the matrix correlations between variables. These preliminary results show that executive 
compensation disclosure score is positively correlated to social responsibility dummy and size firm and negatively 
correlated to ownership concentration. The relatively low correlation coefficients between our explanatory variables 
suggest that multicollinearity is not a serious threat to our multivariate analysis. 
 
Table 4: Correlations Matrix 
 
Disclosure 
Score 
Social 
Responsibility 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Options 
Percentage 
Size Leverage ROA 
Price to 
Book 
Disclosure 
Score 
1        
Social 
Responsibility 
0.34 *** 1       
Ownership 
Concentration 
-0.19 ** -0.09 1      
Options 
Percentage 
0.02 -0.06 -0.02 1     
Size 0.34 *** 0.46 *** -0.10 -0.03 1    
Leverage -0.06 0.11 0.15 ** 0.03 0.22 *** 1   
ROA 0.04 0.02 0.09 -0.08 0.17 ** 0.10 1  
Price-to-Book -0.01 -0.12 * -0.05 0.00 
-0.34 
*** 
-0.19 ** -0.18 ** 1 
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4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 
Table 5 presents the results of an ordered regression of compensation disclosure transparency on social 
responsibility score and control variables. Our dependent variable is an ordinal variable that takes values between 0 
and 10, we therefore rely on an ordered probit model to estimate our regression. Our results show a positive and 
significant association between corporate social responsibility and executive compensation disclosure quality 
(coefficient: 0.637; t-stat: 2.99). This finding supports our hypothesis that socially responsible firms disclose more 
transparent and detailed information about their compensation practices. These results agree with previous studies 
(Gelb & Strawser, 2001; Dawkins & Fraas, 2013) which report a positive association between social performance 
and financial disclosures levels. These findings support the conclusion that increased disclosure transparency 
reflects a company’s social engagement towards its stakeholders. 
 
Consistent with previous studies, we document a positive association between firm size and executive 
compensation disclosure transparency (coefficient: 0,132; t-stat: 2). Our results agree with Lang & Lundholm (1993) 
and Ahmed & Courtis (1999) and suggest that large firms have more resources and expertise to prepare and disclose 
more detailed and transparent information about their executive compensation practices. As shown, in Table 5, we 
document a negative association between ownership concentration and executive compensation disclosure quality. 
This finding agrees with agency theory predictions which suggest that ownership concentration reduce agency costs 
and incentives for additional disclosures. Our results are also consistent with Laksmana’s (2008) suggestion that 
ownership concentration (presence of blockholders) may reduce the concerns of outside shareholders about 
excessive executive compensation as well as the need for extensive disclosures about the details of compensation 
packages awarded to executives. Finally, according to results in Table 5 there is no significant association between 
compensation disclosure score and firm performance, leverage, growth opportunities or the proportion of option 
compensation. 
 
Table 5: Social Responsibility and Executive Compensation Disclosure Transparency 
This table presents the results of an Ordered Probit Regression of compensation disclosure transparency on social 
responsibility and control variables. Sample of 187 TSX firms with G&M executive compensation disclosure scores in 2006. 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity adjusted (White, 1980) standard errors are used to compute t-statistics. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient Stat-t 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure Score 
Independent Variable 
Social Responsibility + 0.637 2.99 *** 
Control Variables 
Ownership Concentration - -0.320 -2.13 ** 
Options Percentage +/- 0.228 0.75 
Size + 0.132 2.00 ** 
Leverage + -0.676 -1.22 
Return on Assets +/- 0.003 0.73 
Price-to-book + 0.030 1.10 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -361.705  
Wald chi2  38.85  
Prob >Chi2  0.000  
No. of observations  187  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigates the association between social responsibility and executive compensation disclosure 
quality for a sample of 187 firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Following Gelb & Strawser (2001), we 
argue that stakeholders may expect that SR firms will exhibit higher transparency in their financial and non financial 
disclosures than other firms because transparent disclosures reflect a socially responsible behavior (Gelb & 
Strawser, 2001). We therefore test whether socially responsible firms disclose more transparent and detailed 
information about their executive compensation packages than non-socially responsible firms. Consistent with our 
expectation, we find a positive association between social responsibility and the transparency of executive 
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compensation disclosures. This finding suggests that stakeholders can play a key role in improving the transparency 
of the information disclosed about compensation practices and thus may limit managers’ rent extraction trough 
excessive compensation. Our results contribute to the growing literature on financial reporting quality and disclosure 
practices of SR firms (Gelb & Strawser, 2001; Chih et al., 2008 Kim et al., 2012; Dawkins & Fraas, 2013). 
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